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Summary 
China’s emerging standing in the world demands a major rethinking of its diplomatic 
strategies. Given its population size, geographical scale, economic power and military 
presence, China is poised to play a larger political role in the twenty-first
 century, and is thus 
perceived by the international community to have greater capacities, capabilities and 
responsibilities. At the same time, environmental stresses caused by China’s energy and 
resources demands have become increasingly evident in recent years, urging China to 
cultivate delicate diplomatic relations with its neighbors and strategic partners. Tensions 
have been seen in areas such as transboundary air pollution, cross-border water resources 
management and resources exploitation, and more recently in global issues such as climate 
change. As the Chinese leadership begins to embrace the identity of a responsible developing 
country, it is becoming apparent that while unabated resources demands and environmental 
deterioration may pose a great threat to environmental security, a shared sense of urgency 
could foster enhanced cooperation. For China to move beyond existing and probable 
diplomatic tensions, a greater attention to domestic and regional environmental security will 
no doubt be necessary. This article explores such interrelations among domestic, regional 
and global environmental securities and China’s diplomacy, and suggests possible means by 
which China could contribute to strengthening global environmental security. 
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China’s emerging standing in the world demands a major rethinking of its diplomatic strategies. 
Given its population size, geographical scale, economic power and military presence, China is 
poised to play a larger political role in the twenty-first
 century, and is thus perceived by the 
international community to have greater capacities, capabilities and responsibilities. At the same 
time, environmental stresses caused by China’s energy and resources demands have become 
increasingly evident in recent years, urging China to cultivate delicate diplomatic relations with 
its neighbors and strategic partners. Tensions have been seen in areas such as transboundary air 
pollution, cross-border water resources management and resources exploitation, and more 
recently in global issues such as climate change. As the Chinese leadership begins to embrace the 
identity of a responsible developing country, it is becoming apparent that while unabated 
resources demands and environmental deterioration may pose a great threat to environmental 
security, a shared sense of urgency could foster enhanced cooperation. For China to move 
beyond existing and probable diplomatic tensions, a greater attention to domestic and regional 
environmental security will no doubt be necessary. This article explores such interrelations 
among domestic, regional and global environmental securities and China’s diplomacy, and 
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The summer of 2010 marked two important milestones for China. On July 10, the International 
Energy Agency reported that China, whose energy demand was merely half that of the United 
States a decade ago, had surpassed the United States to become the world’s largest energy 
consumer (IEA 2010a; IEA 2010b). This historic overtaking was met with little surprise from 
many, despite the immediate objection voiced by the Chinese government (Li 2010). On August 
17, China again made global headlines as it overtook Japan as the world’s second largest 
economy. Pundits and analysts alike asked: “When will China overtake the United States as the 
largest economy in the world?” (Tseng 2010; China Daily 2010a)   
 
While the magnitude of China's transformation continues to attract considerable international 
attention, it needs only to be said that China's influence already extends to many facets of the 
world's economy. China ranks as the world’s largest consumer of many major goods and 
commodities, including, steel (47%), cement (55%), wheat (16%), and corn (19%)
2; and it is the 
world’s largest producer of many more. Furthermore, China has been the world’s largest CO2 
emitter since 2007 (IEA 2007), in spite of its efforts to scale up energy efficiency and 
aggressively promote renewable energy use. Driven by the thirst for resources, China’s 
diplomatic reach also extends to the farthest corners of Asia, Africa and Latin America. The 
changing configurations of the political and economic landscape, coupled with China’s military 
presence, have inevitably unsettled the global balance of power. Consequently, China is 
increasingly seen as a major player within the international community, and as such, is pressed to 
fulfill greater responsibilities and demonstrate a greater capacity and transparency in addressing 
some of the most critical issues of our time.  
 
Until now, China’s economic growth has been fueled predominantly by the use of coal, which 
accounts for some two third of its total primary energy demand (Sun 2010). Such extensive coal 
dependency has come at considerable expense to public health and the environment (Zhang 
2007b). Unabated demands for mineral, water and other natural resources have also continued to 
strain the country's meager supply of resources. The effects have been felt well beyond its 
national border, as seen in regional transboundary environmental problems such as acid rain and 
yellow dust, both highly publicized since the early 1990s. Now, an emerging consensus on the 
threat of climate change casts a new light on these challenges. As China assists its burgeoning 
economy by building a cascade of dams along the Mekong River (Osborne 2004; Goh 2009) and 
converting the country’s Southwestern territories to rubber plantations (Ziegler et al. 2009), the 
environmental and social ramifications of such a rising demand for resources resonates across 
national borders, multiplying risks both to the region itself and to the world at large. At the same 
time, the threats of climate change are becoming increasingly visible in regions such as the 
Himalayas, where important glaciers feeding Asia’s major rivers have shown signs of retreat (Yao 
et al.2007; Xu et al. 2008; Qiu 2008). These trends, together with uncertainty about the 
consequences of climate change, pose significant risks to global and regional security. It is now 
increasingly evident, therefore, that how China handles the environmental security issues arising 
from its growing demand for energy and resources will have decisive implications for its foreign 
relations. 
 
This article explores the interrelationships among domestic, regional and global environmental 
securities and China’s diplomacy. Following a brief discussion of the concept of environmental 
                                                   
2 Steel use is 2009 figure calculated from World Steel Statistical Yearbook 2010 by World Steel 
Association;  Cement use is 2009 figure estimated by the Japan Cement Association; Wheat and 
Corn Demand is 2008-2009 figure calculated from the World Agricultural Supply and Demand 
Estimates (WASDE) of the United States Department of Agriculture.  
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security, the article focuses on certain key issues considered crucial for our understanding of 
environmental security and its implications for China’s foreign relations. Specifically, it addresses 
the following questions: 1) which areas pose significant environmental security concerns for 
China and its neighbors? 2) how might environmental security be affected by the increase in 
global climate change and its associated uncertainty and risk? and 3) how can China best 




II. Environmental Security: Conceptual Overview 
Environmental security, and its corollary concept of climate security, are a fairly recent topic of 
concern in the context of China’s foreign relations. Historically speaking, however, the political 
and social implications of environmental and resources constraints have regularly prompted 
major scholarly inquiries. Within contemporary discourse, the environment and security nexus 
emerged as an important agenda in the 1980s, when critics began advocating the concept as an 
antithesis to the Cold War and to the disproportionate attention given to the military threat as the 
sole risk to national security (Allenby 2000; Dalby 2002; Haggman 2005;  Raleight and Urdal 
2007; Gleditsche 2007). Today, in light of concerns about the rise in climate change, the idea of 
environmental security – and climate security in particular – has gained renewed attention 
(Bernett 2003; Barnett and Adger 2007; Raleigh and Urdal 2007; Brown et al. 2007).  
 
“Could the time be coming when as much lasting security can be purchased through trees as 
through tanks?” asked Norman Myers in his 1989 Foreign Policy article "Security and 
Environment". In his article, Myers highlighted how environmental stresses in already fragile 
states might undermine the economic, political and military interests of the United States, and 
hence urged that these concerns be addressed within the United States’ strategic and national 
security planning. Similar views were also expressed in earlier works on the environment and 
security, including Galtung (1982) and Ullman (1983), which called for renewed political 
momentum towards a comprehensive redefinition of national security (Ronnfeld 1997). In 
addition, the increasing availability of scientific evidence for global environmental threats, 
including ozone depletion and global warming, meant that the traditional roles played by nation-
states, geographical borders, and international agreements were no longer adequate. They also 
required significant redefinition (Mische 1993). “Put bluntly,” as Jessica Mathews (1989) 
succinctly observed, “our accepted definition of the limits of national sovereignty as coinciding 
with national borders is obsolete” (p.174). As such, the contemporary notion of environmental 
security emerged as an alternative to the conventional state-centric and military-focused theory of 
security.   
 
With the demise of the bipolar world and the rise of global environmental concerns, the idea of an 
alternative paradigm gained ever more popular support. However, a significant dissonance also 
emerged, on both a conceptual and an operational level, in terms of providing a clear and 
universal definition of environmental security (Graeger 1996; Barnett 2001).
3 This was partly 
because the notion encompassed several complex and non-linear interactions among human, 
ecological and institutional variables (Homer-Dixon 1991). In addition, scholars and practitioners 
alike often disagreed as to the underlying motivations for, and practical merits of, bringing the 
two concepts of environment and security together (Levy 1995). In the environmental security 
literature, the nature and extent of these interrelations are predominantly shaped by the chosen 
                                                   
3 For detailed discussions of theoretical evolution and the typology of environmental security, 




definitions of the terms "environment" and "security"; and both of these concepts are highly 
contextual, open to various interpretations. As Allenby (2000) states, “[e]nvironmental security, a 
relatively new and still somewhat contentious concept, may be defined as the intersection of 
environmental and national security considerations at a national policy level” (p.5). Here, Allenby 
defines national security within a series of subsets, i.e. foreign policy considerations, human 
security and humanitarian concern, and ultimately the larger considerations of global 
environmental stability. However, it remains unclear as to what specific factors should or should 
not be considered environmental security threats. Arguably, one of the most controversial 
interpretations of the linkage between these factors is the environment-conflict causal 
relationship, originally analyzed by Thomas Homer-Dixon and the “Toronto Group" as well as 
the "Environmental Conflict Project" by the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology and the Swiss 
Peace Foundation (Ronnfeldt 1997; Hagmann 2005). These empirical studies sought to test 
whether or not environmental issues (environmental degradations and/or scarcity of natural 
resources) could trigger acute and violent conflict in vulnerable regions.
4 
 
While such direct links (i.e. the premise that environmental issues "cause" violent conflicts) are 
more often than not refuted, it is commonly accepted that environmental degradation may act as a 
"threat-multiplier" (Homer-Dixon 1991). Furthermore, the notion of environmental degradation 
as a threat-multiplier is also widely established in the analysis of human security. Here, human 
security is defined as freedom from threats such as "hunger disease and repression" as well as 
"sudden and hurtful disruptions in the pattern of daily lives” (UNDP 1994). This human focus 
allows for an in-depth assessment of how environmental degradation may threaten people's well-
being and thereby undermine environmental security, defined as "freedom from environmental 
destruction and resources scarcity” (Gleditsch 2007).   
  
Amidst the ensuing conceptual debate, a growing number of national and international governing 
bodies have also taken steps to address the imperative of environmental/climate security. For 
example, the United Nations Security Council, the United Nations' primary body in charge of 
maintaining global peace and security, held its first discussion on climate change and security in 
April 2007. This landmark discussion was followed by the UN General Assembly’s endorsement 
of Resolution 63/281 in June 2009, calling for intensified efforts by relevant organizations to 
work on issues of climate change and security (UN General Assembly 2009). Having traditionally 
approached climate change from the standpoint of development, the Chinese leadership initially 
resisted the idea of climate change as a national security imperative (Brown et al. 2007; Freeman 
2010); however, such defiance is gradually waning as national security risks arising from climate 
change become more apparent. For example, the escalating importance of climate change as a 
security issue is exemplified in the recent establishment of the Military Climate Change Expert 
Commission within the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA). Formed in November 2008, the 
expert committee is comprised of key government agencies including the National Development 
                                                   
4  Over the years, prolific debates have delineated some of the common themes of environmental 
security. In particular, securitization of environment/climate vs. desecuritization of security 
debate is a recurring theme in the security debate, significantly shaping our understanding of the 
notion of environmental security. These debates beg the question of whether marrying the two 
concepts broadens the realm of security, thereby convincing political leaders to protect "the 
security of [their] citizens above and beyond their military security” (Graeger 1996), or simply 
places "the debate into a political context dominated by institutions designed for completely 
different types of threat” (Buckland 2007, p.13). This is indeed one of the most challenging 
normative questions of environmental security, and as arguments exist both for and against 




and Reform Commission (NDRC), the China Meteorological Administration (CMA), the 
Ministry of Science and Technology (MST), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), and the 
National Natural Science Foundation of China (NSFC). It is expected to carry out research into 
the impact of climate change on military operations, and to serve as intelligence for future 
strategic planning (Freeman 2010). Moreover, the Chinese leadership increasingly perceives 
climate change as a "threat-multiplier" likely to damage security and social stability from the 
standpoint of food and water availability, as well as adversely affecting disaster risk reduction 
(Moore 2009).   
 
 
III. Implications for China’s Foreign Relations 
 
III.1 ‘Peaceful Development’ vs. ‘China Threat’ 
 
China began to implement economic reform in late 1978, and joined the World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in December 2001. As the country’s economy continues to grow, the world 
watches its emergence into the global market with considerable reservations. For outside 
observers, sources of anxiety include China’s human rights background, its history of breaching 
intellectual property, product safety and rising military spending. These cast a looming shadow 
over China’s growth, framing it as a potential destabilizing influence on the global status quo and 
balance of power. This tension was further exacerbated by China’s rising demand for natural 
resources, and its political and ideological divide with the West. China's pragmatic diplomacy 
toward non-democratic states such as Sudan posed a great threat to Western democracies, which 
had traditionally alienated such states for strategic reasons (Zhang 2007a; Kaplan 2010). 
Moreover, growing disagreement about how responsibilities for climate change issues should be 
shared fairly and equitably has also added to diplomatic tension. This line of thinking, dubbed the 
‘China threat theory’, still dominates much of the West’s foreign policy discourse regarding 
China.   
 
For China, a greater influence in the global market and open ties with the world also meant closer 
scrutiny from outsiders of its conduct and underlying intentions.  At the same time, increasing 
disparities in domestic income and regional developmental divides have led to an existing 
paradox: while on the one hand China embraces its identity as a major new world power, on the 
other it is still very much a developing country, with almost half of China’s total population lives 
on less than $2 per day (using PPP conversion rates) (Hallding et al. 2009). In order both to 
respond to international reservations, and to overcome these domestic challenges, the Chinese 
leadership chose the path of so-called peaceful development, or he ping fa zhan, as its primary 
foreign policy doctrine. These progressive commitments to multilateralism, peace and achieving a 
‘moderately well-off society’ by means of a scientific development approach were reaffirmed in 
China’s Peaceful Development Road, the state council’s white paper in 2005. China's 
environmental diplomacy is generally assumed to conform to the following guiding principles: 
serving internal political and economic interests; ensuring self-determination in domestic 
environmental affairs; representing the country as a responsible stakeholder; respecting the Five 
Principles of Peaceful Co-existence; and, finally, supporting the larger goals of Chinese 
diplomatic relations (Shouqiu and Voigts 1993; Zhao and Ortolano 2003).   
 
China's Climate Pledge – "Serious Commitment" or "Business as Usual"?   
While peaceful development remains China's official doctrine, it is debatable as to what extent 
this doctrine has assuaged the anxieties of the international community. Tensions which reflect 
mutual suspicion as well as ideological and cultural differences remain prevalent in foreign policy 
discourse, including that of climate change. As China became the largest CO2 emitter and the  
 
6 
largest energy consumer in the world, the country’s leadership in Beijing found itself increasingly 
exposed to negative outside opinions, instant judgments, and often harsh criticism. With baubles 
of blame hung one by one on the giant Christmas tree of China, the country became the common 
target for international criticism and the censure of analysts (Zhang 2010d).  
 
It remains debatable, of course, whether or not such foreign criticism is well-founded. China’s 
carbon intensity pledge is a case in point. In the run-up to the Copenhagen climate change summit 
in December 2009, Beijing announced its commitment to cutting carbon intensity by 40 to 45 
percent relative to the 2005 level by 2020. This pledge also stressed that renewable and nuclear 
energy would account for 15% of the country’s primary energy consumption by 2020, and that 
China would expand forest cover by 40 million hectares and forest volume by 1.3 billion cubic 
meters relative to 2005. These commitments, deemed ambitious by the Chinese government, were 
quickly dismissed by some Western scholars (e.g. Levi 2009).  
 
To put China’s climate pledge into perspective, Zhang (2010f,g) examines whether China’s 
proposed carbon intensity goal for 2020 is as challenging as the energy-saving goals set in the  
11
th five-year (2006-2010) economic blueprint, to what extent it drives China’s emissions below 
its projected baseline levels, and whether China will fulfill its part in a coordinated global 
commitment to stabilize the concentration of greenhouse gas emissions in the atmosphere at a 
desirable level. It is found that the proposed carbon intensity target certainly does not just 
represent ‘business as usual’, as some Western scholars have argued. On the other hand, that 
target may not be quite as ambitious as China argues. Given that China is already the world’s 
largest carbon emitter and its share in the world’s total emissions continues to rise, even a few 
additional percentage reductions in its carbon intensity translate into a significant amount of 
global emissions reductions. It is hard, but not impossible, for China to increase its own proposed 
carbon intensity reduction target. Zhang (2010f,g) suggests that China should aim for a 46-50% 
cut in its carbon intensity over the period 2006-2020. This 46-50% carbon intensity reduction will 
lead to China’s emissions reductions of 15-21% compared with its baseline levels in 2020 (Zhang 
2010f,g and 2011). That will put China’s absolute emissions reductions very much within the 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change’s recommended level of 15-30% below their baseline 
levels by 2020 for developing countries (IPCC 2007). 
 
Despite hard evidence of China's progress in reducing the growth rate of carbon emissions, 
foreign discourses on China’s commitment to energy-saving measures are still characterized by 
skepticism. Yet the Chinese government has thus far rigorously implemented a wide array of 
energy-saving and climate mitigation measures, including the closure of inefficient fossil fuel-
fired power plants, with total combined capacity of over 72 gigawatts (GW) since 2006; the 
signing of government-industry energy-saving and pollution-cutting agreements known as the 
"Top 1000 Enterprises Energy Conservation Program"; the improvement of fuel economy 
standards that are now more stringent than those in Australia, Canada, California and the United 
States; and the introduction of feed-in tariffs for the increased use of wind energy.
5 To put scale of 
China's renewable energy expansion into perspective, China invested $36.6 billion in renewable 
energy in 2009, eclipsing the U.S. investment of $18.6 billion in the same year. Also, China 
continues to upscale its renewable energy target, where it now aims to have an installed capacity 
of at least 300 GW in hydropower, 180 GW for wind power, and 30 GW for biopower and to 
produce 10 million tons of ethanol and 2 million tons of biodiesel by 2020 (Zhang 2010b and 
2011). Moreover, if China fulfills its pledge, it will do so almost entirely through its own actions; 
                                                   
5 For further discussion on energy-saving and pollution-cutting measures implemented in China, 




unlike many industrial countries, which rely on international off-set markets. However, foreign 
analysts often highlight anxieties about data accuracy, transparency and monitoring capacity, 
rather than analyzing with care these various kinds of institutional progress. Realist perspectives 
define China’s motivation for its international climate regime very narrowly: to “protect its 
sovereignty, acquire foreign aid and technical assistance, and promote its economic development” 
(Harris 2005, p.24). 
 
While these are certainly important incentives for any developing country to implement a 
multilateral environmental regime, such a simplistic portrayal of the decisions made by the 
Beijing leadership overlooks a complex yet steady shift that is taking place within China’s foreign 
policy priorities. There is no doubt that Beijing is now well aware of the risks posed by climate 
change and other environmental threats that the country may face in the future. At the same time, 
Beijing sees the practical benefits of its participation in multilateral arrangements, which offer a 
way to reduce its vulnerability to climate change, improve diplomatic relations and build strategic 
partnerships for a low-carbon growth path (Hanson 2010).    
 
This ongoing shift reflects at least two of the important trends underlying China's environmental 
diplomacy. Firstly, China's foreign policy, as recognized by many, is in a transitional phase; the 
country embraces its "dual identity of Great Power and a developing country” (Shuisheng 2010). 
Given this dual identity, Beijing increasingly acknowledges its responsibility to meet domestic 
and regional needs, embracing the notion of “responsible developing country”. Through this 
notion, the Beijing leadership reinforces the country's commitment to peaceful co-existence with 
the international community. This is not to suggest that China has radically shifted from its 
traditional claim that developed countries should be held more accountable in areas such as 
climate change mitigation.
6 On the contrary, Beijing continues to insist firmly on the principle of 
common but differentiated responsibilities, as evident in China's strong resistance to the long-
term emission caps proposed by developed countries at Copenhagen in December 2009. Rather, 
China’s adjustment to its foreign policy simply implies that it is repositioning itself as a major 
player, seeking to balance its domestic development needs with those of compliance with the 
expectations set forth by the international community.  
 
Secondly, China is already moving away from its previous "development first, treat pollution 
later" economic path (Zhang 2007b). Chinese decision-makers are becoming increasingly 
proactive, giving greater consideration to environmental concerns. Within these broader changes, 
issues such as climate change are given priority, as a potential threat to the economy and 
population is highlighted (Moore 2009; Jacobson 2009). For example, this ascendency of 
environmental issues, and climate change in particular, is reflected in the official opinions on the 
12th five-year plan, delivered at the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Plenum in October 2010. 
Considered as one of the most comprehensive and clear statement on CCP's stance regarding 
                                                   
6 China’s insistence on developed country accountability led to strong criticism during the 
Copenhagen negotiations. French President Nicolas Sarkozy openly criticized China, stating that 
it had impeded progress in the negotiations (Watts 2009). As discussed further in Zhang (2010a), 
China could have avoided such an accusation by insisting on the 80% emission reduction goal for 
developed countries, and demanding in addition that in 2050 the per capita greenhouse gas 
emissions for all major countries should be no more than the world’s average at that time. In any 
case, Zhang (2010a) argues that rejecting a longstanding, widely reported proposal without 
putting forward alternatives cast China in a very bad light. It led to the impression that rich 
countries should not even announce their unilateral cut – at least, this was the impression reported 




climate change, this option stressed the importance of people-oriented principle and the 
strengthening of climate change mitigation (Seligsohn 2010). Hence, Beijing recognizes that the 
country’s diplomatic challenges may be intensified by its own demand for resources together with 
uncertainties arising from transboundary and global environmental issues. As such, the Chinese 
leadership carefully balances its need for development and self-determination on the one hand, 
with the need for dialogue and collaboration on the other.    
      
III.2. Environmental Security Concerns and China's Evolving Diplomacy  
Given the interdependence of environmental issues and demand for resources, China will be 
required to take on greater responsibilities in a regional context. As a natural and inevitable 
outcome of China's growing economic and environmental footprints, its presence both regionally 
and on a worldwide basis will also increase. This section reviews some of the major 
environmental security issues confronting China and its neighbors, and illustrates the role that 
these non-traditional security risks are likely to play in China's evolving foreign relations. 
 
Northeast Asia:  Acid Rain and Yellow Dust 
In Northeast Asia, both acid rain and yellow sand pose environmental and public health threats to 
China and its neighbors. Acid rain, caused by SO2 and NOx emissions due to fossil fuel 
combustion, affects approximately one third of China's landmass, harming the country’s vital soil 
and water resources as well as forest health and China’s cultural heritage (Vennemo et al. 2009).  
In China, acid rain falls mainly in the South, due to naturally existing basic dust components 
found in the North, which neutralize acid rain. In 2009, acid rain fell on 258 cities and counties of 
China, many of which were located in the region as far west as the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau to south 
of the Yangze River, and around Sichuan (Chen 2007).  
 
China has taken rigorous efforts to regulate SO2 emissions, including the phasing-out of small and 
inefficient coal-fired power plants, and the required installation of flue gas desulferization (FGD) 
systems for coal-fired plants. The coal-fired units installed with FGD increased to 470 GW in 2009 
from 53 GW in 2005. Accordingly, the portion of coal-fired generation capacity with FGD rose to over 
80% in 2010 of the total installed thermal capacity from 13.5% in 2005 (Zhang 2010b and 2011). 
However, despite such unprecedented efforts, the areas affected by acid rain are reported to have 
grown, and an increased acidity has been recorded in some of these areas (Zhao et al. 2009; Jing 
2011). This trend is of particular concern since, as Zhao et al. (2009) estimate, the success of 
rigorous SO2 reduction may be largely offset by an anticipated increase in NOx emissions due to 
increased power generation and rapid motorization. To combat this increase, the Chinese 
authorities are currently considering the introduction of a reduction target for NOx, along with 
additional control measures, in the next five-year plan (Jing 2011). In China, acid rain afflicts the 
country's already low-quality soil and water, which are threatened at the same time by a number 
of man-made pressures including deforestation, urbanization, population growth and 
industrialization.   
 
Due to the apparent time-lag caused by the lengthy soil response to acid deposition, the real 
impact of acid rain is still unclear, although early signs of soil degradation have also been 
observed in China, such as the case of red and red-yellow sand in South and Southeast China 
(Chen 2007). These acid deposits are known to slowly alter soil structure and chemistry, thereby 
reducing land arability, while also affecting soil biodiversity and carbon content. Of course, such 
trends may also be exacerbated by other anthropogenic stresses, including the over-application of 
fertilizer (Guo et al. 2011). These trends are likely to affect long-term land arability and forest 




Yellow sand, a vital sign of severe soil erosion, also poses considerable health risks to China and 
its neighbors. Decades of rapid industrialization and land conversion have led to severe 
deforestation and grassland degradation in much of China’s northwest region. These, together 
with other complex triggers, have caused seasonal dust and sand storms. In the 1950s, the region 
experienced on average about 5 dust and sand storms annually. This figure steadily increased: it 
was 14 times higher in the 1970s, and 23 times higher in the 1990s (UNEP 2004). The magnitude 
of the destruction caused by sandstorms is indeed alarming. For example, in 1993 alone, a dust 
storm caused 85 deaths, 264 injuries, 373,000 ha of crop damage and additional damage to 
livestock in Northwestern China, with direct damage totaling US$ 66 million. In 2006, a severe 
sand storm caused two deaths along with total economic damage of more than US$ 1.25 million 
(Brettell 2007; UNEP 2004). The leeward countries of Korea and Japan also report frequent 
damages. In March 2002, for example, a major storm prompted Korea to close 4,949 schools and 
cancel 40 flights at Gimpo Airport (Yamamoto 2007; UNEP 2004).  Japan has also been affected 
(although to a lesser extent), and the effects on health care in particular have raised public 
concern.  
 
The fact that these are transboundary issues has been propelling China to join a multilateral 
collaboration. A gradual shift in Beijing's reactions to regional initiatives reflects China’s 
recognition of the magnitude of these issues, which has led the country to take a more active role 
in policy dialogue.  
 
Regarding acid rain, the history of collaboration dates back to the mid-1980s, when the scientific 
community in Korea and Japan began to suspect that the problem was a transboundary one. Since 
the late 1980s, the results of Japanese studies indicated excessive deposition as compared with 
national SO2 emissions (Brettell & Kawashima 1998). Likewise, in 1987, a Korean study 
conducted on Baekyung Island by the Korean National Institute of Environmental Research 
(NIER) confirmed that acid deposition in Korea is also affected by air pollution from China 
(Yoon & Lee 1998). In response, Japan and Korea both advocated stronger regional collaboration, 
with Japan’s Environmental Agency calling in 1991 for the establishment of an Acid Deposition 
Monitoring Network in East Asia (EANET), and Korea’s NIER demanding in 1999 that a Joint 
Research Project on Long-Range Air Pollutants (LTP) be implemented by China, Japan and 
Korea (Nam 2002).  
 
China’s initial reaction to these regional initiatives was characterized by ambivalence. Although 
China had participated in joint research in earlier years, it was not until 1992 that it officially 
acknowledged its partial responsibility for the acid rain problem (Brettell 2007). Even within the 
framework of the EANET, Beijing showed an initial reluctance to participate on a formal basis. 
The Chinese delegate cited domestic demands for the establishment of a State Environmental 
Protection Agency (SEPA) as a reason to postpone official participation. However, China 
accepted official member status in December 1998, and subsequently became one of the most 
enthusiastic members of this acid rain initiative (Takahashi 2002; Nam 2002).
7 
                                                   
7 Since its official commencement in 2001, membership of the EANET has grown to 14 countries 
of Northeast and Southeast Asia, with 56 wet deposition and 47 dry deposition monitoring sites as 
well as 19 ecological monitoring sites operating across the region. These monitoring data are 
made available online, and the EANET holds periodic policy dialogues, capacity-building and 
technical training for member countries (EANET website; Zhang 2008). Despite such efforts, 
however, uncertainty remains as to whether this initiative will become a successful regulatory 
regime with mandatory reduction targets. Its future success relies on many factors, including a 
secure financial base, an improved scientific consensus, better coordination and the continued 




Governments in the region also began collaborative work to address the issue of yellow sand. The 
Tripartite Environment Ministers’ Meetings (TEMM), held annually with delegates from China, 
Japan and Korea, provide a common platform for dialogue on this issue. Since 2000, cooperation 
developed from a joint workshop to afforestation and monitoring projects, and eventually to an 
initiative to create the Yellow Dust Monitoring Network. The three governments have been 
working since 2004 with the Asian Development Bank (ADB), the Global Environmental Facility 
(GEF), and several other UN organizations on a project for regional dust and sandstorm 
monitoring and early warning (Brettell 2007; Zhang 2008). Of the many initiatives which exist in 
the region, TEMM is considered one of the most active partnerships, providing an important 
forum for policy dialogue, including climate change issues.  These case studies illustrate not only 
that the Chinese authorities recognize their regional responsibilities, but also that regional 
collaboration could bring tangible benefits to China, in the form of improved access to 
information and monitoring capabilities, and better diplomatic relationships with neighboring 
countries. While the worsening problems of acid rain and yellow sand pose a great threat to 
environmental security in the region, the Chinese government is joining the regional dialogue to 
address these challenges.  
 
Southeast Asia: Hydropolitics of Mekong River Delta 
China's interests are inextricably linked to those of Southeast Asia, and will increasingly be so in 
years to come. Economically, China is already ASEAN's largest trade partner, and ASEAN is 
China's third, thanks to the ASEAN-China Free Trade Agreement (FTA), which came into effect 
on January 1, 2010 (People's Daily 2010; Guo and Cheng 2011). From a security perspective, 
moreover, Southeast Asia is of critical importance: several of China's major maritime choke 
points, including the straits of Malacca, Lombok, Makassar and Sunda and the South China Sea, 
hold strategic significance here (Vaughn and Morrison 2006). Among the region’s important non-
traditional security agendas is water resource management, which significantly reflects the 
interplay of these diplomatic considerations.   
 
Beijing had been criticized for many years for its general reluctance to join multilateral 
engagements relating to the affairs of Southeast Asia. Sino-Southeast Asia relations were long 
characterized by “suspicion and fear” (Vaughn and Morrison 2006), as exemplified by the 
controversies over the management of the Mekong River. However, the hostility of regional 
diplomacy is gradually waning as China shows greater flexibility and readiness to collaborate 
with its Southeast Asian neighbors.  
 
The Mekong River, with a total length of 4,880km, runs through China, Myanmar, Laos, 
Thailand, Cambodia and Vietnam, providing a vital water source for the local population and the 
environment. Historically, the Mekong River has been of cultural and economic importance to the 
region's estimated 80 million people, who depend on the river for irrigation water, drinking water, 
freshwater fishing, and other uses (Osborne 2004; Goh 2009).  
 
These dynamic and rapidly growing riparian states collectively form the vulnerable basin of the 
Mekong River, where hydropower expansion and deteriorating water quality due to industrial and 
agricultural uses have caused increased water stress over the years (Osborne 2004: Goh 2009). 
China, as the upper-stream stakeholder, has principal leverage over the management of the 
Mekong River. To illustrate, it is commonly estimated that the Chinese basin contributes on 
average 16% of run-off to the Mekong River. China's contribution is particularly crucial during 





dry seasons, when as much as 40% of the river’s water is supplied by the Chinese basin (Osborne 
2004). Any major developments in navigation and hydropower along this portion of the Mekong 
River, therefore, could have a damaging effect on downstream ecosystems and livelihoods. It is 
widely agreed that mega-scale dam construction could damage the fragile river system by altering 
water flow and silt transportation. Reduced annual silt delivery would not only hamper 
agricultural productivity downstream, but would also severely impact wild fish catch, which 
could in turn threaten food security in the region (Osborne 2004; Cronin and Hamlin 2010).  
 
As such, the downstream riparian states have repeatedly requested that China participate in 
multilateral consultation. In 1995, these states established the Mekong River Commission (MRC) 
to address regional concerns regarding sustainable river basin management. Since the inception of 
the MRC, China and Myanmar have refrained from official participation, for which they have 
been frequently criticized (Morton 2008; Goh 2009). China has thus far constructed three of 
fifteen planned hydroelectric dams along the Mekong River. When completed, the project's total 
generation capacity will exceed 25.2 GW, with an annual power generation of 120 terawatt-hour 
(Li 2008), serving as a vital backbone of China’s West-to-East power transmission program.  
 
Responding to these rising concerns, the Chinese authorities have repeatedly stressed that dam 
construction does not harm the environment, and it will also bring a stream of benefits to the 
region, including improved navigation and flood and drought control. Indeed, the production of 
hydropower could also help to minimize the use of coal, which in the long run contributes to 
climate change (Li 2008).  
 
China’s general reluctance to participate in multi-lateral engagement stems from at least two 
response factors. First, water scarcity is a pressing issue for China. Highly uneven water 
availability, rising demand and declining water quality all pose increasing water stress, 
particularly in Northern China. China's per capita water availability of 2200m
3/year is merely a 
quarter of the world's average (Liu et al. 2007), with Northern China supporting the water 
demands of as much as 45.2% of the country's population, despite possessing only 19.% of 
China’s total water resources (Jiang 2009). Water quality is also declining in many parts of the 
country. For example, some 60% of all Chinese rivers are classified as unsuitable for providing 
drinking water (i.e. Class IV or worse), and half of the country’s 27 major lakes also contain 
water unsuitable for any human uses (Vennemo et al. 2009). As such, the water issue is of 
increasing importance to China.  This fact is also exacerbated by the frequent occurrence of 
floods, droughts and other hydrological hazards; in the first half of 2010 alone, catastrophic 
floods in China resulted in 392 deaths and 143 missing people, affecting a further 72.97 million 
people and damaging 4.63 million hectares of cropland (China Daily 2010b; Lei 2010). Secondly, 
China's unique geography makes transboundary management of such a scarce resource 
particularly challenging. Currently, China shares 18 major international river basins with its 
neighboring countries, including Amur, Ganges-Brahmaputra-Meghna, Har Us Nur, Hsi/Bei 
Jiang, Indus, Irrawaddy, Mekong, Pu-Lun-To, Red/Song Hong, Salween, Sujfun, Tarim, Tumen 
and more than 40 tributaries (Wolf et al. 1999; Backer 2007; Yan & Daming 2009). In many 
cases, China is the upper-stream riparian state in these international river basins. The Chinese 
government fears, therefore, and quite reasonably so, that its handing of the Mekong River may 
expose it to similar demands by other downstream states, complicating already fragile water 
resource configurations (Backer 2007). As such, Beijing has generally been reluctant to join 
multilateral discussion on this issue.  
 
Despite such concerns, however, the Chinese government has also shown an increased flexibility 
and readiness to collaborate with its Southeast Asian neighbors. In many ways, the severe drought 
in spring 2010 catalyzed such collaboration. In April 2010, the MRC convened its first summit in  
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Hua Hin, Thailand, where the member state delegates discussed pressing issues concerning the 
management of the Mekong River. The Chinese delegation, led by Vice Foreign Minister Song 
Tao, also participated, reaffirming China’s commitment to pursuing enhanced regional 
partnership in this matter. Making such symbolic gestures as sharing dry season data for the first 
time, the Chinese representative emphasized that the severe drought was due to the forces of 
nature, and not China’s hydropower developments. Moreover, the Chinese delegation proposed to 
the MRC six possible avenues for further partnership. These included expanded collaboration 
through the ASEAN-China FTA on the issues of environmental impact assessment, agricultural 
trade and development, and transportation and tourism; and joint work on regional natural 
disaster reduction capacity-building (China Daily 2010c).  
 
Following this meeting, the Chinese authority also invited MRC members to visit  the Xiaowan 
and Jing Hong dams in Yunnan province. The MRC representatives visited the dams for the first 
time in June 2010, marking an important step in the process of moving dialogue forward. During 
this visit, the Chinese authorities shared information on hydropower project planning and design, 
and assured the MRC that China’s projects would not have a severe impact on downstream water 
flow. In addition, the Chinese experts also organized flood and drought management training 
sessions for the MRC members (MRC 2010). As exemplified in these gestures, the Chinese 
government is adopting an increasingly open stance towards its Southeast Asian neighbors, as 
well as identifying strategic channels for further partnerships.
8  
 
In addition to the Mekong River cooperation, regional forums such as ASEAN Plus Three offer 
China’s Northeast and Southeast Asian neighbors an opportunity to strengthen their partnership 
with China. Within this framework, the ASEAN members and China, Japan and South Korea 
have held annual Environment Ministers Meetings since 2002, and have exchanged information 
regarding environmental cooperation and other issues of strategic importance (ASEAN 2002). 
Through the establishment of the East Asia Summit (EAS) in 2005, and the endorsement of the 
Singapore Declaration on Climate Change, Energy and the Environment in 2007 (ASEAN 
2007),
9 these efforts have also been increasingly formalized. Building on these initiatives, China 
also established the China-ASEAN Environmental Protection Center in March 2010; this center is 
expected to play an important role in fostering exchange and environmental collaboration (MEP 
2010).  
                                                   
8 In addition to transboundary water management, land use change poses another concern in the 
region. As the world’s largest consumer of many industrial materials, including rubber, the 
Chinese government has promoted rubber plantation in the region through multilateral and 
bilateral initiatives. According to a recent study by Ziegler et al. (2009), the extent of land 
conversion may exceed 50,000 ha in China’s uplands and adjacent countries, and demands for 
land could double or triple by the year 2050. Such an extensive conversion could have a 
devastating impact on ecosystems and livelihoods, leading to loss of biodiversity, carbon lease 
and the potential depletion of water resources. The mechanisms of environmental impacts of such 
conversion are difficult to identify, particularly for the region’s hydrology calling for careful 
assessment and collaborative research work in the region. 
 
9 Although the Singapore Declaration does not include emissions reduction targets, it recognizes 
the need for collective action, pledging to “commit to the common goal of stabilizing atmospheric 
greenhouse gas concentrations in the long run, at a level that would prevent dangerous 
anthropogenic interference with the climate system“. The declaration also includes the “EAS-
wide aspirational goal of increasing cumulative forest cover in the region by at least 15 million 





Greater Himalayan Region : Local and Ecological Vulnerabilities  
Due to its extreme susceptibility to warming, the Qinghai-Tibetan glacial system is regarded by 
many as the "canary in the coal mine" of climate change (Morton 2008). Indeed, climate change 
could pose a significant threat to the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau in the form of melting permafrost, 
disappearing glaciers, frequent glacial lake outbreak flooding (GLOF), dwindling water resources 
and alterations to climate-regulating mechanisms. As such, a myriad of environmental security 
risks are posed to the highly heterogeneous yet vulnerable populations of China and its South 
Asian neighbors.  
 
With an average altitude of more than 4,000m, the Qinghai-Tibetan Plateau contains 36,800 
glaciers, or as many as 46,300 glaciers if its surrounding areas are included (Yao et al. 2007). 
This Plateau is often termed the world's "third pole", because of its importance as freshwater 
reservoir outside the polar regions. The Plateau's ecosystem is characterized by its high 
vulnerability and endemism, with its unique topography extending to the Tibet Autonomous 
Region (TAR), Qinghai, Gansu, Yunnan, Sichuan and Xinjiang provinces in China, and parts of 
India, Pakistan Tajikistan, and Nepal (Cui and Graf 2009).  The Qinghai-Tibetan region is of 
particular importance, as its glacial melt feeds Asia’s major rivers, including the Yangze, the 
Yellow, the Amu Darya, the Indus, the Ganges, the Brahmaputra, the Amu Darya, the Irrawaddy, 
the Salween and the Mekong.  It is commonly estimated that the Himalayan ecosystem supports 
150 million people directly (Zurick et al. 2005), while the larger river systems, fed by glacial 
melt, support as many as 1.3 billion in the Asian region as a whole (Xu et al. 2009). Hence, 
accelerated glacial melting due to climate change could trigger cascading damage to ecosystems 
and livelihoods, threatening food security and water security, eroding critical habitats and 
biodiversity, and multiplying hydrological disaster risks to surrounding areas (Xu et al. 2009; 
Morton 2008).   
 
Glacial dynamics are indeed complex, with mountain glaciers' slow but continuous downward 
movement resulting in a natural time-lag between climatic change and glacial response. 
Moreover, because long-term observations in the remote areas of the Himalayas are lacking, a 
comprehensive assessment of glacial mass is particularly challenging (Malone 2010). While such 
a lack of knowledge in itself exposes the region to great uncertainty in times of climate change, 
emerging scientific evidence also points to a possible, very bleak reality for the Himalayan 
region. Not only has the retreat of the Himalayan glaciers been indicated by measurements of 
their termini, but losses in glacial mass have also been reported. According to Yao et al. (2007), 
the proportion of glacial retreat has steadily increased from 53.4% (of 116 glaciers surveyed) in 
the 1950 to 1970 period, to 95% (of 612 glaciers) in the years from 1990 to 2005. Furthermore, 
the rate of retreat is also accelerating for these glaciers. To illustrate, both Large and Small 
Dongkemadi of the Tanggula Mountains were still showing evidence of advance in the 1990s; 
however, this trend has since reversed into retreat, with Large Dongkemadi retreating as fast as 
4.6 m/year (in 2001) and Small Dongkemadi 2.9 m/year (in 2002)  (Yao et al. 2007). The region’s 
warming is partly accelerated by the release of so-called "black carbon" — soot generated from 
the combustion of biomass including wood, crop residues and dung. As a result, the region's 
temperature has risen by as much as 0.3 
oC per decade, or some three times the global average 
over the past 50 years (Qiu 2008). 
 
The acceleration of glacial melting may have a series of adverse effects on the surrounding 
ecosystems and people.  In the short term, such effects may manifest themselves as localized 
phenomena within highly vulnerable high-elevation communities, such as GLOFs and the 
dwindling of water resources (Malone 2010). What makes this particularly alarming is that such 
burdens may fall disproportionately on the shoulders of the poor and vulnerable; the high-altitude  
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nations of Bhutan and Nepal, for instance, rank 132
nd and 144
th in the Human Development Index 
(UNDP 2009), and the Tibetan Autonomous Region also ranks among the poorest regions in 
China. Sustainable livelihood is therefore already a pressing issue for local communities, even in 
the absence of glacial melt, and this pronounced imbalance between the polluters and the affected 
inevitably triggers debate about environmental justice and equity. Projected population growth 
and ethnic tensions in these regions further complicate the matter (Walsh 2009). 
 
In the longer term, these effects may manifest themselves more gradually as wider regional and 
global concerns. The total contribution of Himalayan glacial melt to surrounding rivers varies 
considerably, from a relatively low contribution (1.3% of the Yellow; 6.6% of the Mekong; 8.8% 
of the Salween) to a high one (40.2% of the Tarim and 44.8% of the Indus). These figures also 
vary seasonally, with glacial and snow melt supplying as much as 70% of flow to the Indus, the 
Tarim and the Ganges prior to and after summer monsoons. In the Indus River Basin in Pakistan, 
for example, glacial and snow melt from the western Himalayas, Hindu Kush and Karakoram 
supplies some 50% of run-off to the local population’s irrigation system; while in Western China, 
glacial melt provides 12% of water flow, supporting as much as 25% of China's population during 
dry seasons (Xu et al., 2009). As such, significant alteration to river run-offs could severely affect 
these highly susceptible regions.  
 
To address these critical concerns, a number of local and regional initiatives have been taken both 
inside and outside China. For example, the International Centre for Integrated Mountain 
Development (ICIMD), established in 1983, fosters information exchange, policy dialogue and 
collaborative projects concerning sustainable livelihood and environmental conservation. The 
ICIMD is a consortium of eight member countries, including Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, 
China, India Myanmar, Nepal and Pakistan, which works toward common challenges of 
adaptation and development in the region. On a bilateral basis, Indian and Chinese institutions 
have also begun discussions regarding joint research to monitor the impact of climate change on 
glaciers in the region, although a tangible partnership is yet to be established (Lamont 2009). On 
a domestic level, the Chinese government also promotes energy conservation and the shift to 
renewable energy use. Since 2001, energy-intensive industries including 7 steel plants, 9 cement 
producers and 4 paper mills have been shut down in Tibet, and the government has put an end to 
the commercial logging of natural forestation. The current government’s plan for ecological 
protection includes graze-land protection, afforestation, and water and soil loss control, with an 
allocation of Yuan 15 billion by 2030 (Xinhua 2010).  
 
As this case illustrates, climate change may trigger complex human security concerns with a 
distinctive combination of international and local aspects. On the one hand, the inherently 
transboundary nature of climate change means that any national authority must work with its 
neighbors to foster enhanced communication regarding shared interests. At the same time, efforts 
to oppose climate change also demand consideration of unique local needs for sustainable 
development, calling for community-based resilience building beyond mere reliance on 
technology-based solutions. Therefore, whether or not, and to what extent, the Chinese leadership 
can address such regional cooperation and local needs will have a decisive impact on the region’s 
environmental security.  
 
Africa: New Development Partnership   
China's engagement in Africa could prove a fundamental means of capturing the region's 
potential, and shift the locus of world power to developing countries. However, any development 
path taken must also respect environmental considerations. The Sino-African relationship has 
expanded in scope and scale from a foreign aid-oriented relationship in the early 1990s to one 
based on private-sector trade and investment (Wang 2008). According to recent estimates, Sino- 
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African trade has increased from US$ 4 billion in 1995 to US$ 106.8 billion in 2008, with Africa 
now supplying about 30% of China’s total crude oil imports (Vines 2007; Peh and Eyal 2010). As 
China’s dependence on Africa’s resources increases, its presence and influence in Africa become 
ever more significant. Such deepening ties have provided a new source of both hope and anxiety 
for domestic and international observers. Environmental security within the Sino-African 
relationship, therefore, is becoming subject to closer international scrutiny.   
 
To foster mutual cooperation, the Forum for China Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) was established 
in 2000. The Beijing Declaration, adopted at the first Ministerial Meeting, stresses the importance 
of “just and equitable new international political and economic order” and “the effective 
participation of developing countries in the international process of decision-making” (MOFA 
2000). With these common goals, China and Africa have expanded the scope of their 
collaboration. Since 2007, when the Chinese government established the China-Africa 
Development Fund, China has provided invaluable support to the region, including infrastructural 
development and debt relief for the most heavily indebted African states (China Daily 2010d; 
Zhang 2007a). 
 
Thus far, China’s active involvement in Africa has raised a number of diplomatic and human 
rights concerns. As frequently pointed out (e.g., Lombard (2006), Taylor (2008), and Kaplinsky et 
al. (2007)), China’s pragmatic relationship with the non-democratic states of Africa has helped to 
undermine Western efforts to promote and protect human rights and good governance. China has 
demonstrated its capacity and willingness to replace Western investments when these are 
withdrawn for political reasons. For example, the Chinese state-owned firm China National 
Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) became the largest share-holder in the Greater Nile Petroleum 
Operating Company (GNPOC) operating in Sudan, after a Canadian firm withdrew investment 
due to its concerns about the government's handling of the situation in Darfur. China also 
extended loans to Angola after non-transparency concerns led to the suspension of the Western 
donors’ conference in 2005 (Kaplinsky et al. 2007). For these reasons, China’s growing ties with 
the African states began to worry Western observers. 
 
While human rights concerns are well-documented, environmental impact per se has received 
less attention. This is due to the unavailability of detailed information on China’s commercial 
engagement in Africa. This lack of transparency and available information further feeds Western 
anxieties (Peh and Eyal 2010). Limited studies have merely pointed out a lack of civil society 
participation in China’s project implementations. Coupled with the inadequate undertaking of, or 
follow-ups to, environmental impact assessments, this may be of increasing concern – as in the 
cases of the Loango National Park in Gabon and the Merowe Dam in Sudan (Bosshard 2008; 
Kaplinsky et al. 2007). Certainly, further research will be needed to gauge the environmental 
impact of China’s involvement in Africa.  
 
While concerns remain, it is important to remember that China’s engagement also offers 
considerable assistance to Africa’s developmental needs. This is particularly true at the present 
time, as China continues to support Africa’s infrastructural needs after the disengagement of the 
US and European donors due to economic slowdown (Saches 2010). Under the banner of South-
and-South partnerships, China's enhanced involvement could mean a brighter outlook for Africa’s 
economic future. For example, Beijing now promotes the use of Special Economic Zones (SEZ) 
in Africa—an economic model that has helped to boost China’s own economy since the 1980s. 
Thus far, Chinese firms have taken the initiative to build several such zones in countries such as 
Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Mauritius, and Zambia (China Economic Review 2010). 
Regarding China’s hunt for oil and natural resources, as long as Chinese state-owned oil majors 
are trying to acquire sensitive oil assets, political issues will be hard to avoid. To better serve  
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China’s interests, Chinese majors should team up with Western oil majors in pursuing overseas 
acquisitions and takeovers. China should be very cautious in pursuing oil diplomacy and business 
in Africa and other regions, giving proper consideration to the international community’s 
concerns and avoiding coming into direct conflict with Western countries. 
 
While much uncertainty remains as to Africa's future, it is certainly true that China is likely to 
play a larger role in promoting Africa’s human and environmental security; hence, its conduct 
will receive increased international attention. 
 
III.3. Uncertainty, Risks and other Implications of Climate Change  
Climate change also undermines environmental security in the form of increased uncertainty and 
risks. It is commonly believed that China will be one of the most affected countries if climate 
change unfolds as predicted, and among the various consequences anticipated, water security, 
food security and coastal vulnerability are likely to be of particular concern. 
 
Firstly, climate change will likely affect China's vulnerable hydrology by altering precipitation, 
evaporation and glacial and snow melt patterns. The recent decades have already shown a 
worrying sign: the drier North and Northeast China have received less rainfall (a decline of 20 to 
40 mm per decade) since the 1950s, while the wetter South China has received more precipitation 
(an increase of 20 to 60 mm per decade) on average (Wang et al. 2010; Piao et al. 2010). If this 
trend continues, the already dry Northern China may be subject to an increased risk of drought, 
while the South may become prone to flooding, adding a significant strain to China's vulnerable 
hydrology. Perhaps, one of the major risk factors with climate change is that of glacial melting. 
The common estimates suggest that significant reduction in glacial volume is likely in most cases, 
with minor glaciers of less than 1 km
2 in size being at risk of complete disappearance in the next 
50 years. While varied estimates themselves contribute to uncertainty, up to 27% of glacial area is 
estimated to vanish by 2050, and 67% by 2100. Such 'tipping point' of glacial melting could pose 
a formidable challenge to environmental security both inside and outside China (Piao et al. 2010).    
 
Secondly, climate change may threaten China's food security, although the sensitivity of 
agriculture to changes in climate is difficult to estimate precisely. Depending on various 
assumptions regarding CO2 fertilization, water availability and the spread of pests and disease, 
the net impact of climate change on China's agriculture may be positive or negative. In a bleak 
scenario, China's cereal output could decline by as much as 4-14% (rice), 2-20% (wheat) and 0-
23% (maize) by 2050.
10 With additional environmental degradation such as O3 pollution, grain 
output could further decline by 7-10% (rice), 2-7% (wheat) and 16% (maize) (Piao et al, 2010). 
In particular, rain-fed agriculture in North and Northeast China will likely be hit hard, by multiple 
stresses of precipitation decline, soil moisture shortfall and competing water demands. Currently, 
these areas account for 38% of China's total cropland and 24% of total food output (Tao et al. 
2003). Rising temperature and falling rainfall in key pasture regions could also hamper China's 
livestock production; beef output, for example, is projected to decline by 9.8% by 2030 (Wang et 
al. 2010). These trends, coupled with rising demand for food products due to income rise and 
shifting diet, may drive up food prices worldwide, significantly undermining the food security of 
vulnerable populations. 
 
Thirdly, sea level rise may have an impact on China major coastal cities. According to China’s 
National Assessment Report on Climate Change, a rise in sea level of 1 m would inundate as 
much as 92,000 km
2 of the three major industrial areas, including the Gulf of Bohai, the Yangze 
                                                   




River and the Pearl River delta (Zeng et al. 2008). Furthermore, recent evidence suggests that the 
ice caps may be melting more quickly than anticipated (Rahmstorf, 2007). If melting accelerates 
further, a 3 m forecast provides a suitable benchmark, especially when considering increased 
storm surge risk. Incorporating recent estimates of each country’s share of GDP that is exposed 
with a 3 m rise in sea levels in coastal zones (Dasgupta et al., 2009), Buys et al. (2009) find that 
East Asia and the Pacific region is expected to be strongly affected by sea level rise. The effects 
on Vietnam will be particularly striking, experiencing an exposure of 24.2% of GDP because of 
heavy exposure in the Mekong and Red River Deltas. China’s exposure is estimated at 5.6% of 
GDP. Translated into an absolute value, this exposure will be very large (Buys et al., 2009). Such 
an impact could indeed jeopardize the region’s environmental security, through multiple channels 
of direct and indirect consequences. Indeed, climate change could place an increased burden on a 
number of environmental security issues addressed in the previous section. 
 
While enhanced partnerships are certainly needed, one manner in which China chooses to address 
mitigation strategies could fuel increased anxiety. Heightened tensions are seen not only in areas 
such as the United States’ proposal for border carbon adjustments (Zhang, 2009, 2010c and 
2011), but also the future course of international climate change negotiations and peripheral 
issues such as China’s nuclear power development and its handling of the so-called "rare earth 
metal" trades. What should be stressed here is that these issues will require genuine dialogue and 
diplomacy if China is to reassure the Western world of its commitment to the path of peaceful 
development.     
 
Since China's first nuclear power plant was built in Zhejiang in 1983, the Chinese leadership had 
long remained unsure as to what contribution nuclear power should make to the country’s overall 
energy supply (Zhang, 2010b and 2011). The recent years, however, have seen a marked shift 
toward expanded nuclear development, due largely to its energy security and the influence of 
environmental concerns.
11 In June 2007, the NDRC issued China’s medium- and long-term 
nuclear power development plan, which aimed to add a total installed capacity of 40 GW, with 
another 18 GW under construction by 2020. This plan was further adjusted in 2009 to reflect an 
unexpected increase in power demand, coupled with increasing concerns about global climate 
change and environmental deterioration. The new plan scaled up nuclear power development to 
the greatest possible extent; accordingly, China’s National Energy Administration now aims to 
have 70 GW or more of nuclear power capacity in operation, with another 30 GW under 
construction, by 2020 (Zhang 2010b). This will require the construction of 28 additional reactors 
in the next decade (Wang, 2010).  
 
While China has kept a good safety record, challenges associated with capacity-building and 
transparency have nevertheless alarmed both domestic and international analysts. To illustrate, 
China’s nuclear industry is estimated to demand an additional  5,000 to 6,000 personnel per year, 
while domestic institutions  can only supply about 2,000 new professional staff annually (Chen 
                                                   
11 A turning point came in early 2004, when China celebrated the 50
th anniversary of its nuclear 
industry establishment. Then, Vice Premier Huang Ju emphasized that special attention should be 
paid to the future development of nuclear power. This was followed by a media statement by Xu 
Kuangdi, the then President of the Chinese Academic of Engineering, which reported that the 
Chinese government has plans to pursue the active development of nuclear power to replace the 
existing moderate development. On March 2, 2005, the Premier Wen Jiabao released instructions 
to adjust China’s energy mix and vigorously develop nuclear power. This was widely viewed as a 




2010). Such a training gap must be addressed in a collaborative fashion, if the leadership in 
Beijing is to ease the concerns of its neighbors and China’s own population
12.  
  
Finally, the Beijing leadership may face increased diplomatic tensions in the area of clean energy 
industry competition. A recent controversy over rare earth elements illustrates this point. These 
are 17 metallic elements used to produce a number of sophisticated products including hybrid 
vehicles, wind turbines, energy-efficient light bulbs and military equipment. The world market in 
these products is currently dominated by China, which supplies some 93 percent of rare earth 
elements (Bradsher 2009b). In recent years, Beijing introduced a series of production and export 
quotas to address domestic environmental concerns. Because rare earth metals are used in 
strategic industries, this greatly alarmed industrial countries,
13  who speculated as to the real 
motivation behind Beijing’s drastic restriction on rare earth exports (Foster 2010; The Economist 
2010). It is unsurprising that such an abrupt decision made without open dialogue would come at 
a high political cost to China. As the rest of the world diversifies its supply sources, the even 
worse scenario of supply shock may be averted; however, lack of mutual understanding on this 
issue could cost China's diplomatic image in the long run. 
 
 
IV. Concluding Remarks 
Given its population size, geographical scale, economic power and military presence, China is 
poised to play a larger political role in the twenty-first century, and is thus perceived by the 
international community to have greater capacities, capabilities and responsibilities. At the same 
time, environmental stresses caused by China’s demands for energy and resources are becoming 
increasingly evident, urging China to foster delicate diplomatic relations. As has been illustrated, 
for China to move beyond existing and probable future diplomatic tensions, a greater attention to 
domestic and regional environmental security will no doubt be necessary.  With strong and 
transparent leadership, China can contribute to environmental security in a number of positive 
ways.  
 
Firstly, China can further reduce its pollution and demand for natural resources. This reduction 
may be achieved by the continued promotion of energy efficiency, the widespread use of 
renewable energy, and strengthened environmental regulations. As China has already committed 
to quantified energy conservation and clean energy targets, the goals set by the next five-year 
                                                   
12  No doubt, through more advanced reactor designs and improved operation standards, the 
likelihood of serious accidents has reduced significantly over the past decades, and should 
engender less concern today than it did in the 1980s. However, the recent radioactive leak at the 
Daya Bay plant on May 23, 2010 illustrates that an increased transparency and communication 
with the public is of paramount importance if Beijing is to ensure safe nuclear power 
development (Bradsher 2009a). In today’s globalized world, if there is a nuclear accident in one 
country, then it is a nuclear accident for the rest of the world in terms of its chill effect on 
operations and the development of nuclear power. Thus, it is a matter of self-interest for China 
and all other countries, regardless of the expansion of their nuclear energy, or the construction of 
their first nuclear reactor, to adhere to the same high safety standards, particularly given that a 
renewed interest in nuclear power is apparent in nearly all regions in the world. 
 
13 As of July 2010, for example, the export quota was reduced to 40% below the 2009 level. In 
response, the price of rare earth materials such as cerium oxide and neodymium surged from 
some US$8000/t to US$36,000/t, and US$37,650/t to US$56,750/t respectively from July 2010 to 




economic plan must be as stringent as those of the 11
th five-year plan, thereby increasing energy 
conservation, renewable energy and other low-carbon technologies. Building on China's current 
plans to decommission thousands of small and inefficient coal-fired power plants with a unit 
capacity of 50 MW or less, the country could consider doubling or even quadrupling the threshold 
to 100 MW or 200 MW, so that more inefficient plants will be decommissioned. Moreover, China 
needs to accelerate the restructuring of its industry, remove pervasive subsidies and improve the 
incentive structure of local governance. Achieving such goals should transform from current 
reliance on command and control regulations to a policy based on market-oriented instruments. 
(Zhang 2010b,d). In addition, China can address some of its key hydrological vulnerability by 
promoting water use efficiency, tacking water pollutions and investing in hydrological disaster 
risk reductions (DRR).  
 
Secondly, China can foster dialogue, collaboration and information-sharing with its neighbors. As 
illustrated earlier, a lack of communication and transparency may magnify mutual suspicion and 
resentment, whereas enhanced dialogue fosters mutual trust among China and its neighbors. 
Whether via joint research or participation as observers, it is important that all parties involved 
identify common areas of interest. To foster genuine partnership, the interested parties must 
design strategic arrangements whereby all countries involved will benefit from active 
participation. The desired incentives should be such that active participation will yield benefit, 
rather than penalizing or condemning non-participation. From this standpoint, China’s recent 
gesture to foster dialogue and collaboration within the Mekong River Commission framework is 
clearly a step in the right direction. An expanding platform for environmental dialogue and 
cooperation, such as that provided by TEMM and ASEAN Plus Three, also provides further 
opportunities to address regional environmental security concerns, and the increased involvement 
of civil society would certainly be desirable.  
  
Finally, China can demonstrate clear political commitment to environmental security. Such a 
gesture will not only foster collaboration but also avoid unnecessary diplomatic friction. For 
example, if China well in advance indicates a serious commitment to address climate change in 
the form of an emissions cap around the year 2030, such a signal will challenge the legitimacy of 
the U.S. inaction, as well as of proposed carbon tariffs. The positive stance will move climate 
negotiation forward significantly. For this, it is advisable that China takes absolute emission caps 
around 2030 with the three transitional periods of increasing climate obligations, namely 1) 
further credible energy-conservation commitments starting in 2013; 2) voluntary "no lose" 
emission targets starting in 2018; and 3) binding carbon intensity targets staring in 2023, before 
taking on absolute emissions caps that will lead to the global convergence of per capita emissions 
by 2050.
14 However, if China does not present these signals well in advance, that will not help 
move beyond the existing stalemate of international negotiations, and at the same time the 
country will continue to face the threat of trade measures (Zhang 2010c).
15  
  
                                                   
14 For more discussion please refer to Zhang (2010e and 2011), which lays out a roadmap for 
China to 2050. Also see Zhang (2000 and 2010c,d,e) for detailed discussion on China’s climate 
strategies regarding the format and timeframe that it would take on climate commitments.
 
 
15 See Zhang (2009, 2010c and 2011) for detailed discussion on the WTO scrutiny of emissions 
allowance requirements (EAR) under a cap-and-trade regime proposed in the Lieberman-Warner 
bill in the U.S. Senate and in the Waxman-Markey bill in the U.S. House of Representatives, 
whether an EAR threat would be effective as an inducement for major emerging economies to 





Meanwhile, to support China’s peaceful development path, the international community must 
take a practical attitude to the goal of environmental security. As seen in current climate talks, 
attempting to pressurize China may be counterproductive in achieving the ultimate goal of 
mitigation. After all, what matters most is the extent to which China cuts its greenhouse gas 
emissions, and not how it makes its commitments. Continuing to blame China for the inaction of 
the international community is certainly not a constructive approach. Instead the United States 
and other developed countries should scale up its technology transfer and deployment, financing 
and capacity building to enable China to meet the goals. Likewise, in addressing broader concerns 
about environmental security, the priority should be to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and 
communities. With these common goals in mind, the international community must demonstrate 
its own accountability, while China must act as a large and responsible developing country and 
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